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SYNOPSIS 
Because “priorities” are such an important and difficult issue in Article 9 
of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), most commentators use what 
might be called an individualized or seriatim approach to priorities.  For 
example, most commentators start by describing the rules of priorities for 
individual kinds of properties or for individual kinds of transactions.  Then the 
commentators move on to second kinds of properties or transactions and 
describe the priorities for them, and then to a third, etc.  However, because the 
priority rules are so difficult, the individualized or seriatim approach to 
discussions of priorities often generates confusion or a lack of full 

∗ Paul Wangerin received his J.D. with High Honors from The John Marshall Law School in 
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Court and an associate attorney at Winston & Strawn, Chicago’s oldest law firm.  He joined the 
faculty at The John Marshall Law School in 1982. 
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understanding.  The analysis of priorities here differs.  This analysis suggests 
that there is a hierarchy of priorities in Article 9 of the UCC and that this 
hierarchy is relatively simple to describe.  The analysis here describes this 
hierarchy by engaging in a two-part analysis.  Part I suggests that the rules for 
priorities in Article 9 come out of the interaction of a number of variables, 
variables that are well-known to everybody who is familiar with Article 9.1  
Part II suggests that the variables described in Part I allow us to put all of the 
important rules about priorities into a simple chart that shows how the various 
different priorities interact with each other.2 
INTRODUCTION 
Everyone who is familiar with the practice of law in connection with 
Article 9 of the UCC3 knows that in many cases non-paying debtors have 
enough money to pay some but not all of their debts.  In these very common 
cases, lines of creditors form to recover from the debtors.  Creditors at or near 
the front will likely collect at least something from the debtors.  Creditors at or 
near the end, however, will not collect at all, or will collect only pennies on the 
dollar.  Thus, when creditors line up to collect from non-paying debtors, 
creditors always try to position themselves as far forward in the lines of 
creditors as possible. 
Generally speaking, commercial law uses a system of priorities to 
determine where individual creditors get to stand in the line of creditors.4  
Creditors with high priorities get to stand at or near the front.  Creditors with 
low priorities have to stand at or near the end.  Article 9 of the UCC provides 
most of the rules about priorities; however, the United States Bankruptcy Code 
(“Bankruptcy Code”) adds some important ideas as well. 
Most books and commentators on Article 9 priorities use what might be 
called an “individualized” or “seriatim” approach to priorities.  For example, 
most commentators start by describing the rules of priorities for individual 
kinds of property or for individual kinds of transactions.  Then the 
commentators move on to second kinds of property or transactions and 
describe their respective priorities, and then to a third, etc.  However, because 
the priority rules are so difficult, the individualized or seriatim approach to 
discussions of priorities often generates confusion or a lack of full 

1 See infra Part I. 
2 See infra Part II. 
3 U.C.C. § 9 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
4 JAMES J. WHITE, ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, WHITE AND SUMMERS’ 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1227 (6th ed. 2015). 
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understanding.  Hardly any commentators, it seems, attempt to show how 
different priority ideas fit together with each other, or where different kinds of 
priorities have related but different impacts on individual debtors or creditors.5  
For example, discussions of priorities rarely (if ever) show how creditors with 
attached but not perfected security interests stand in relation to other kinds of 
creditors.  Likewise, discussions of priorities rarely (if ever) show how various 
liens—like statutory, tax, bankruptcy, or judicial liens—fit into an overall 
scheme of priority, or fit together with Article 9 security interests.  Rather, 
most discussions of priorities simply state what the priority is for certain kinds 
of claims and leave it at that.  No overall scheme is described. 
The analysis here addresses this problem by suggesting that there is an 
overall hierarchy of priorities articulated in Article 9 of the UCC.  A simple 
chart, reproduced at the end of this analysis, depicts this hierarchy.6  The higher 
that individual creditors are in terms of this overall hierarchy (i.e., the higher 
that individual creditors are on this chart), the farther forward these creditors 
stand in lines of creditors who are trying to collect from non-paying debtors.  
On the chart there are several different “layers” or “tiers.”  Priority claims in 
the various tiers or layers are mostly treated the same. 
A quick introductory point must immediately be made.  The ideas 
discussed in Part I of the analysis here are extremely familiar and known to 
anybody who works with Article 9.7  Therefore, the analysis here moves over 
these ideas very quickly and provides few reference citations.  The point of the 
analysis is not to repeat ideas that everybody already knows.  Rather, the point 
of the analysis is to organize these ideas in a way that has not yet been done.  
So, the organization of the ideas, rather than the ideas themselves, are the key 
to understanding here. 
Before we get to the different kinds of claims to property and the 
claimants who will go in various layers or tiers of priority, we must start with a 
couple of basic priority points.  These ideas cut across all aspects of priority. 
First, generally speaking, secured creditors or lien creditors would stand 
ahead of unsecured or non-lien creditors in a line of creditors, at least in terms 
of individual items of property of debtors.8  Thus, for example, if C1 has an 
unsecured claim against D dated January 1 and C2 has a secured claim against 
D dated May 1, C2 will likely be farther forward in the line of creditors than 
C1 because C2 is a secured creditor and C1 is an unsecured creditor.  So, 

5 An exception here is Douglas Whaley. 
6 See infra tbl. 1. 
7 See infra Part I. 
8 See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-322(a)(1) (AM. INST. LAW & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
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generally speaking, secured or lien creditors are much more likely to get paid 
than non-secured, non-lien creditors. 
Second, earlier in time liens or interest creditors stand ahead of later in 
time liens or interest creditors, subject to some very important exceptions (the 
most important of which is the Purchase Money Interest (PMI) exception).9  
So, for example, if C1 has a secured claim against D dated January 1 and C2 
has a secured claim against D dated May 1, C1 likely will be farther forward in 
the line of creditors lined up against D than C2.  However, an important 
exception might apply if C2 is a PMI creditor and C1 is not such a creditor. 
Third, if debtors declare bankruptcy, a trustee (representative) for the 
debtor will be appointed and instructed to act on behalf of the general creditors 
collectively.  So, if D declares bankruptcy, a trustee for D will be appointed 
and that trustee will then represent all of the general or unsecured creditors of 
D, for example, C1, C2, and C3.  In addition, the Bankruptcy Code states that 
this bankruptcy trustee will have the status of a lien creditor against the 
bankrupt debtor.10  Thus, and again by way of example, though C1, C2, and C3 
(unsecured creditors) individually may be near the end of the line of creditors 
trying to collect from D, B (the bankruptcy trustee for D who represents C1, 
C2, and C3) will get to move forward in the line of creditors against D and 
stand with the other lien creditors against D.   
I.  DIFFERENT KINDS OF CLAIMS TO PROPERTY AND THE PRIORITY OF THE 
DIFFERENT KINDS OF CLAIMS 
As we will see, it is possible to put together a list of seven different kinds 
of claimants (or different kinds of interests) to particular property of debtors.  
Claimants early on this list, and at the bottom of our chart of hierarchy, have 
low priority in the property.11  If debtors have limited amounts of property, 
these low-priority claimants will usually get little or nothing.  Conversely, 
claimants late on this list who are high on the chart of priority will likely 
recover at least something.  Claimants who are in individual tiers or layers in 
this hierarchy of priorities usually will fight it out amongst themselves using 
the earlier-in-time or earlier-in-line general rule.  
A.  Wrongful Possessors of Property 
We start with a very quick reference to one of the most important rules of 

9 See id. § 9-322. 
10 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2012). 
11 See infra Part II. 
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property law, the rule of nemo dat, also referred to as nemo dat quod non 
habet.12  No one (nemo) gives (dat) what (quod) he or she doesn’t have (non 
habet).  The heart of the idea is that transferors of property (of any kind) can 
only give to their transferees what the transferors themselves had.  Thus, if 
transferors of property have no title or rights in the property, then those 
transferors cannot give title or rights in that property to their transferees.  The 
same thing occurs with defective title or defective rights.  If transferors have 
defective title or rights in property, then the transferors can only give to 
transferees that defective title or those defective rights. 
There’s good news and bad news about nemo dat.  The good news is that 
this rule provides lots of protection to original owners of property or original 
claimants against property.  This is so for a simple reason.  If thieves or 
fraudsters wrongfully take property from the original owners of that property, 
the thieves or fraudsters have no rights, or defective rights in the property.  
Thus, if the thieves or fraudsters transfer that property to third parties, the third 
parties get only what the transferors had, which is little or nothing.  Thus, 
following these kinds of transfers, the original owners can get the property 
back from the transferees.  The bad news is that some transferees of property 
will have no rights in that property at all.  This is so even if these transferees 
themselves are perfectly innocent possessors of the property and completely 
unaware of the wrongful things that have happened to the property in the past.  
In terms of liens and security interests, the foregoing means that some 
transferees of property will take property subject to any and all liens and 
security interests against it.  This is so even if these transferees thought that 
they were getting clean ownership of the property and were totally innocent.  
We’ll just call these transferees wrongful possessors of the property, albeit 
sometimes innocent wrongful possessors. 
Note quickly that we will see later that some transferees of property will 
qualify to be “rightful possessors” of property.  Several different kinds of 
rightful possessors exist, including, most importantly, “good faith possessors” 
of goods.  Because it is quite easy to qualify to be a rightful possessor—it’s 
even easy to qualify to be a rightful possessor who fits into the “good faith 

12 U.C.C. § 1-201(29)–(30) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001); Id. §§ 9-201(a), 
9-203(b)(2) (2010); see also Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Using First Principles of 
UCC Article 9 to Solve Statutory Puzzles in Receivables Financing, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 297 
(2010/2011); Steven L. Harris & Charles W.  Mooney, Jr., U.C.C. Article 9, Filing-Based 
Authority, and Fundamental Property Principles: A Reply to Professor Plank, 69 BUS. LAW. 79 
(2013); WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, UNDERSTANDING NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND PAYMENT 
SYSTEMS (2009); WHITE ET AL., supra note 4, at 199–200; The Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet Rule, 
LAW TEACHER, http://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/commercial-law/the-nemo-dat-quod-
non-habet-rule-commercial-law-essay.php (last visited Nov. 16, 2015). 
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possessor” subcategory—rightful possessors of property are likely to be much 
more common in the real world than wrongful possessors. 
A.  General Creditors 
Some credit sellers and credit lenders provide credit sales or loans on an 
“open account” or “unsecured” or “non-lien” basis, while other creditors do not 
seek to get non-consensual liens against the property of their debtors at all.  
These creditors, often called general creditors, do not have either consensual 
security interests or non-consensual liens against the property of their debtors.  
The best examples of unsecured or open account or non-lien creditors are Visa 
and MasterCard. 
General (i.e., unsecured) creditors have claims against the persons of 
debtors, because the debtors either have agreed to make payments to the 
creditors or otherwise have rights against the persons of the debtors.  
Importantly, however, unsecured (i.e., non-lien, open account creditors), do not 
have claims against any individual property of their debtors.  Rather, and to 
repeat, the claims of these creditors are against the persons of the debtors.  To 
be sure, general creditors may be able to get judgments against their debtors 
and then turn those judgments into claims against the property of the debtors 
with the use of judicial liens, which we’ll come to in a moment.  But, at least 
initially, general (unsecured) creditors only have claims against the persons of 
debtors. 
And now a quick reminder about what happens in cases where debtors 
declare bankruptcy.  First, as noted before, under the Bankruptcy Code, the 
bankruptcy trustee (or other representative) of the debtor represents the 
interests of all the general creditors.  So, if a debtor declares bankruptcy, all of 
the debtor’s general creditors will be represented by the debtor’s bankruptcy 
trustee.  Second, the Bankruptcy Code says that the trustee (or other 
representative) of the bankrupt debtor has the status of a lien creditor of the 
debtor.13  The widely used terminology in this context is that the trustee (or 
other representative) of the debtor has a bankruptcy lien against the property of 
the debtor.  This means that debtors’ general creditors on an individual basis 
stand near the end of lines of creditors.  But, collectively, the general creditors 
may be represented by a bankruptcy trustee who gets to stand farther forward 
in the lines of creditors.14 

13 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2012). 
14 Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code contains rules that determine priorities among general 
creditors.  Thus, for example, the Bankruptcy Code says that family law debts, alimony, child 
support, etc., have the highest priority among general creditors.  Id. § 507(a)(1).  Expenses related 
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It should not be underestimated how many creditors of particular debtors 
will be unsecured, i.e., general creditors.  So, candidly, there will be lots of 
people and businesses standing in this part of lines of creditors (although, as 
we’ll see soon, these people and businesses in some cases will have a 
representative standing ahead of them in the line). 
One further point must be made about unsecured creditors.  Since Article 
9 puts all unsecured creditors in the same layer or tier of the hierarchy of 
priority, unsecured creditors usually beat each other based on the time debts 
were incurred.  Thus, earlier in time usually beats later in time.15  Note, 
however, that this applies only to claims in this layer or tier.  As we’ll see, later 
in time claims in higher layers or tiers may beat earlier in time claims in this 
unsecured claimants layer or tier.  
B.  “Step 1” Secured Creditors—Attached but not Perfected Interests 
Those familiar with practice under Article 9 of the UCC know that 
generally speaking (and leaving aside deemed or operation of law security 
interests16), consensual security interests come into existence and provide full 
protection to creditors as the result of a two-step process.  The first step 
involves “attachment.”  The second step involves “perfection.” 
For the moment, we will focus on Step 1 of the two-step process, the 
attachment step, because we are only interested in what might be called Step 1 
security interests.  Later, we’ll come back to Step 2 of the two-step process and 
talk about perfection of security interests, after which we’ll talk about Step 2 
security interests. 
Attachment, the first step in the usual two-step process for security 
interests, converts claims against the persons of owners of the property into 
claims against the property itself.17  Usually, the attachment stage requires 

to bankruptcies themselves are second and third on the list of priorities among general creditors.  
Id. § 507(a)(2)–(3).  Employee wages are in the number four slot among general creditors and 
unpaid contributions to employee benefit plans go fifth.  Id. § 507(a)(4)–(5).  The list goes on and 
on.  However, other than these bankruptcy priorities for general creditors, general creditors usually 
share among each other on a pro rata basis.  See, e.g., id. § 726(b) (2012); JUDGE JUDITH K. 
FITZGERALD, JUDGE ARTHUR J. GONZALEZ & JUDGE MARY F. WALRATH, BANKRUPTCY ¶ 17:1720 
(Rutter Group, Nat. Ed. 2015).  Often these priorities (and this pro rata rule) among general 
creditors mean nothing because in many bankruptcy cases, all of the debtors’ money is gone by the 
time the general creditors get to the front of the line of creditors. 
15 U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012). 
16 However, with deemed security interests and agricultural liens (which are treated for most 
purposes like security interests), the interests come into existence by operation of law rather than 
by attachment.  See id. § 9-310.  
17 Id. § 9-203. 
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satisfaction of three elements: (1) a security agreement and a record of the 
agreement; (2) payment of value; and (3) rights by the debtor in the collateral.  
The need for these three elements indicates that in most cases commercial 
actors who wish to have fully effective security interests must take some 
affirmative steps to bring about attachment.  Further,  the necessary elements 
for attachment indicate that, in virtually all cases, creditors who have attached 
security interests know that these interests exist. 
Because attached security interests are claims against particular property 
of debtors, attached claims to particular property have priority over general 
claims against debtors who own or possess that property.  This is because, to 
repeat, general claims are only claims against the persons of the debtors—not 
claims against particular property of the debtors. 
Note now an extremely important point: It is indeed a good thing to have 
an attached security interest.  That’s because attached security interests against 
particular property will generally beat general claims against the owners of the 
property.  But, attached security interests do not provide full protection because 
security interests in property become fully effective—and provide full 
protection to creditors—only if the interests have also gone through Step 2: 
Perfection. 
As a practical matter, perfection usually follows attachment as a matter 
of course because most creditors—or certainly their lawyers—know that 
attached interests do not fully protect creditors.  Further, in a significant 
number of cases— for example, those involving consumer goods—attached 
interests perfect automatically.  In these cases, the creditors need not do 
anything at all to perfect their interests.  Given the foregoing, attached but not 
perfected interests are relatively rare.  However, sometimes creditors forget to 
perfect, or excessively delay in perfecting, already attached interests.  Further, 
in cases involving deemed security interests, the creditors probably won’t even 
know that they have security interests that need to be perfected.  So, failure to 
perfect already attached security interests does occur. 
Given all of the foregoing, a couple of things are clear.  First, as noted 
earlier, Step 1 consensual interests—attached but not perfected—beat general 
claimants because attached interests are claims against property of debtors 
whereas general claims are claims only against the persons of debtors.18  
Second, Step 1 security interests should be lower in the priority scheme than 
Step 2 consensual interests, because Step 1 interests are not fully effective 
whereas Step 2 interests are fully effective.19  Third, since Article 9 puts all 

18 Id. § 9-322(a)(3). 
19 Id. § 9-322(a)(2). 
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Step 1 security interests in the same layer or tier of the priority hierarchy, Step 
1 security interests compete against each other by time obtained.  Earlier in 
time (among Step 1 interests) usually is earlier in line.20 
Finally, here are a couple of crucially important ideas.  First, it is rare to 
see a Step 1 consensual lien holder attached but not perfected in court, because 
as soon as litigation threatens, Step 1 consensual lien holders take steps to 
perfect their liens.  Hence, by the time litigation actually happens, the Step 1 
consensual lien holders usually are Step 2 consensual lien holders.  Second, 
Step 1 consensual lien holders have lower priority than Step 2 consensual lien 
holders.21  Third, buyers of property that are subject to Step 1 consensual 
interests (i.e., attached but not perfected interests), have priority in the property 
over the interest attached but not perfected creditors.  Finally, as we’ll see next, 
Step 1 consensual liens (attached but not perfected) are usually lower in 
priority than non-consensual liens (statutory, tax, judicial and bankruptcy 
liens).22      
C.  Non-Consensual Lien (P-STJB Lien) Creditors 
Anyone who has studied or read about Article 9 security interests and 
various kinds of liens—the most important kinds of liens being statutory, 
judicial, bankruptcy, and tax liens—knows that the terminology used in 
connection with discussions of security interests and liens can be quite 
confusing.  In fact, the terminology used in that context sometimes is flat out 
contradictory. 
 That being said, we need to start with some basic definitions, beginning 
with “lien” and “security interests.”  The most concise definitions for these 
terms can be found in section 101 of the Bankruptcy Code.  A “lien” is defined 
as a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or 
performance of an obligation.”23  The term “security interests” is defined as a 
“lien created by an agreement.”24 
These definitions make it clear that at least in bankruptcy proceedings—
where a very large percentage of secured transactions problems work 
themselves out—the term “lien” includes all of the different kinds of property 
interests described herein.  Those interests in property are (1) Article 9 

20 Id. § 9-322(a)(3). 
21 Id. § 9-322(a)(2). 
22 Id. § 9-333. 
23 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (2012). 
24 Id. § 101(51). 
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“security interests,”25 which in almost all cases are “consensual security 
interests”26; (2) “deemed security interests,” which are created by operation of 
law;27 (3) “agricultural liens,”28 which are created by statute but for most 
important purposes are treated like Article 9 security interests;29 and (4) non-
consensual liens (especially possessory-statutory, tax, judicial, and bankruptcy 
liens). 
The terminology problem stems from the fact that Article 9 has different 
definitions for these same terms.  For example, the Bankruptcy Code provides 
the following definition of “lien creditor”:
 (52) “Lien creditor” means:  
(A) a creditor that has acquired a lien on the property involved by attachment, 
levy, or the like;  
(B) an assignee for benefit of creditors from the time of assignment;  
(C) a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of the petition; or  
(D) a receiver in equity from the time of appointment.30  
This Article 9 definition of “lien creditor” clearly excludes possessors of 
Article 9 security interests, including “deemed” security interests.  Rather, this 
Article 9 definition indicates that lien creditors are solely non-consensual 
creditors, such as those who have statutory, tax, bankruptcy, and judicial 
liens.31  Further, the UCC’s definition of “security interests”32 strongly 

25 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001). 
26 See U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
27 Paul Wangerin, Deemed Security Interests: A Trap for the Unwary (2015) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author).  Deemed security interests come into existence in connection 
with some lease transactions, some consignments, some “tolling” arrangements, and some transfers 
of payment rights.  Id. 
28 U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(5) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
29 Agricultural liens do not come into existence through the normal “attachment” process; 
rather, agricultural liens “become effective” by operation of law.  See id. §§ 9-308(b), 9-308 cmt. 2. 
30 Id. § 9-102(a)(52). 
31 See id.  Interestingly, this Article 9 definition of “lien creditor” also excludes possessors of 
what Article 9 itself calls agricultural liens.  See id.; see also id. § 9-102(a)(5).  This exclusion 
occurs because Article 9 says that, at least for perfection purposes, agricultural liens are treated like 
Article 9 security interests.  See id. § 9-308. 
32 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2001). 
“Security interest” means an interest in personal property or fixtures which 
secures payment or performance of an obligation.  “Security interest” 
includes any interest of a consignor and a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, a 
payment intangible, or a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to 
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suggests that security interests in the UCC are not “liens” as the Bankruptcy 
Code defines liens.  Likewise, UCC sections 9-109, 9-317, 9-322, and 9-333 
suggest the same thing.33  In the UCC, security interests, either consensual or 
deemed security interests, are—well—security interests.  They are not liens. 
Note here that Article 9 differentiates between “possessory” statutory 
liens—where a creditor with a statutory lien has possession of the property—
and “non-possessory” statutory liens—where the creditor does not have 
possession of the property.  Article 9 concerns itself only with possessory-
statutory (“P-S”) liens.34  Non-possessory statutory liens are covered by non-
UCC law.35 
Which brings us to the definitions we need.  Because we will mostly be 
talking about Article 9 issues in this analysis, we’ll use the Article 9 
terminology herein (even though we’ll frequently be talking about bankruptcy 
cases).  Thus, the term “lien” will be used herein only to describe non-
consensual liens against property interests such as possessory-statutory, tax, 
judicial, and bankruptcy liens (“P-STJB”) liens.  The term “lien” also will from 
time to time herein be used to describe agricultural liens.36  This is so even 
though agricultural liens are treated for many purposes as if they are security 
interests.  On the other hand, the analysis here will use the term “security 
interest” only to describe consensual security interests in property and “deemed 
security interests” in property.  Said in reverse, consensual interests in property 
herein and deemed security interests in property will exclusively be called 
security interests. 
A brief word must now be said about priority and non-consensual liens.  

Article 9.  “Security interest” does not include the special property interest 
of a buyer of goods on identification of those goods to a contract for sale 
under . . . Section 2-505, the right of a seller or lessor of goods under Article 
2 or 2A to retain or acquire possession of the goods is not a “security 
interest” but a seller or lessor may also acquire a “security interest” by 
complying with Article 9.  The retention or reservation of title by a seller of 
goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer under Section 2-
401 is limited in effect to a reservation of a “security interest.”  Whether a 
transaction in the form of a lease creates a ‘security interest’ is determined 
pursuant to Section 1-203. 
Id. 
33 Compare U.C.C. §§ 9-109, 9-317, 9-322, 9-333 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 
2010), with 11 U.S.C. § 101(37) (2012). 
34 See U.C.C. § 9-333 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
35 Id. § 9-109(c)–(d).  However, in some cases, non-UCC statutes about statutory liens 
sometimes explicitly state that the statutory liens will have priority over other kinds of interests and 
liens.  The UCC respects these explicit statements about the priority of statutory liens.  Id. § 9-
333(b). 
36 See id. § 9-109(a)(2). 
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These liens, which include statutory, tax, judicial and bankruptcy liens, 
(hereinafter “P-STJB liens”) are imposed on debtors by statutes or by court 
orders.  P-STJB liens are NOT consensual.  Note, however, that agricultural 
liens, which are created by statutes, are for the most part treated as if they are 
security interests.  So, to the extent that agricultural liens are mentioned herein, 
they will be discussed alongside security interests. 
Statutory liens – other than agricultural liens (which are created by 
statute but treated as if they are security interests) – usually protect providers of 
services to owners of property of non-consensual creditors of the owners of 
property.  Thus, for example, if P, a plumber, provides services to H’s home, 
and if H then doesn’t pay for the services, P can complete paperwork that will 
give P an interest in H’s home.  Thereafter, if necessary, P can use judicial 
proceedings to sell H’s home and use the proceeds of the sale to pay down H’s 
debt to P.   Statutory liens come in an almost infinite variety, all the way from 
liens such as the plumber’s lien, just described, through liens that highly skilled 
professionals can impose on clients’ property, lawyers liens, for example, and 
architects’ liens. 
Tax liens are liens against property that government taxing authorities 
can impose on the property of taxpayers if the taxpayers haven’t paid their 
taxes.37  After tax liens are imposed on property, the taxing authorities can, if 
necessary, take the property away from the taxpayers, sell it, and use the 
proceeds of the sales to pay down the tax debts. 
After people or businesses declare bankruptcy, the bankruptcy system 
appoints trustees or representatives for the bankrupt debtors.  These 
representatives thereafter act on behalf of the bankrupt debtors’ general 
creditors.  As was originally stated in Section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 
bankruptcy trustees have the status of lien creditors.38  Unofficially, however, 
lawyers and judges in these cases usually say that bankruptcy trustees have 
“bankruptcy liens” against the property of debtors.  Once the trustees get these 

37 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321–6323 (2012). 
38 Per Section 70(c): 
The trustee, as to all property, whether or not coming into possession or 
control of the court, upon which a creditor of the bankrupt could have 
obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings at the date of bankruptcy, 
shall be deemed vested as of such date with all the rights, remedies, and 
powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon by such proceedings, 
whether or not such a creditor actually exists.   
The Hypothetical Creditor and the Trustee in Bankruptcy under Section 70C—Constance v. 
Harvey Rejected, 2 B.C.L. REV. 372, 372 n.5 (1961), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol2/ 
iss2/17.  Note that U.C.C. section 9-102(a)(52) also states that bankruptcy trustees have the status 
of lien creditors. 
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bankruptcy liens, the trustees can take the covered property away from the 
debtors, sell it, and use the proceeds of the sales to pay off as much as possible 
of the debtors’ debts to general creditors.  Thus, though general creditors 
individually stand very near the back of the line of creditors than line up 
against debtors, the general creditors collectively get to stand farther forward in 
the lines of creditors.  That’s because lien creditors, including the bankruptcy 
trustee, generally go ahead in lines of creditors than general creditors. 
Finally, if people or businesses obtain judgments against others that 
involve money owed by the judgment defendants, and if the judgment 
defendants don’t pay those judgments, the judgment plaintiffs can take 
additional steps to obtain “judicial” or “judgment” liens against the judgment 
defendants’ property.39  Then, if the judgment defendants still don’t pay the 
judgments, the judgment plaintiffs can (with court assistance) take the liened-
against property away from the judgment defendants, sell it, and use the 
proceeds of the sales to pay down the judgments. 
Note now a subtle but important point.  If you think carefully about this, 
you will see that in virtually all cases of P-STJB liens, public records are 
available of the existence of P-STJB liens or some substitute for these public 
records exist.  With tax, judicial and bankruptcy liens, court filings or 
otherwise accessible public documents there are public records that reveal the 
existence of the non-consensual liens against property.  Usually these records 
exist in records about the real property of debtors.  Further, public paperwork 
showing statutory liens usually exist.  And in other statutory lien cases, the 
creditors maintain possession or control of the property subject to the liens.  
Said differently, “secret” liens are not much of a problem with P-STJB liens 
because of the public records. 
It is now extremely important to note that P-STJB liens become fully 
effective as soon as the requisite steps to create them have been completed.  
Thus, for example, if a judgment creditor gets a judicial lien against a debtor’s 
property on January 1, that lien is fully effective on January 1.  No second step 
is needed to make these liens fully effective.  Likewise, if the taxing authorities 
get a tax lien against a debtor’s property on January 1, the tax lien is fully 
effective on January 1.  Again, no second step is needed.  Likewise with 
bankruptcy liens and possessory-statutory liens (other than agricultural liens).40  
Bankruptcy and possessory-statutory liens are fully effective the date that they 
are obtained.  No second step is needed to complete them. 

39 U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2), cmt. 4 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); see also id. 
§ 9-333. 
40 For bankruptcy liens, see section 9-102(a)(52) of the U.C.C.  For statutory liens, see section           
9-333 of the U.C.C. 
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Because P-STJB become fully effective as soon as they are created, the 
timing (priority) date for P-STJB liens is the date of creation, or the date of 
otherwise completion of the process of creating, these liens.  There is, to 
repeat, no second step needed.   
The foregoing combination of facts brings us to an absolutely critical 
idea.  Because P-STJB liens are fully effective as soon as they are created and 
because consensual security interests that have completed only Step 1 are NOT 
yet fully effective, in terms of priority (timing), P-STJB non-consensual liens 
are superior to Step 1 consensual security interests.  Again, that’s because non-
consensual P-STJB liens are fully effective upon creation, but Step 1 
consensual liens are NOT fully effective (because they have not yet gone 
through Step 2).  This means that P-STJB liens will be higher in hierarchy of 
priority than Step 1 consensual liens. 
One last point must be made about P-STJB non-consensual liens.  Since 
Article 9 puts these kinds of liens together in the same layer or tier of its 
hierarchy of priority, P-STJB liens have priority against each other based on 
time obtained.  Thus, consistent with the general rule that earlier in time is 
earlier in line, earlier in time P-STJB liens beat later in time P-STJB liens.41  
D.  “Step Two” Secured Creditors – Attached AND Perfected Security 
Interests 
As noted earlier, security interests only become fully effective following 
the completion of a two-step process.  Step 1, attachment, converts claims that 
creditors have against the persons of debtors into claims against particular 
property of the debtors.  Step 2, perfection, extends the effect of the claims 

41 Some supplemental timing ideas for P-STJB liens must also be mentioned:  
 Statutory: Timing for statutory liens differs in different jurisdictions.  Usually, the time will be 
the time that providers of services retain possession of the property or submit appropriate 
paperwork to government officials.  Important Note: In construction cases, the general rule is that 
all statutory liens on the construction take effect at the time of beginning of construction.  Thus, 
later service providers in construction cases will have the same timing date for liens as earlier 
service providers.  
 Tax: The time tax authorities file tax lien paperwork in the U.C.C. or real property recording 
systems. 
 Judicial: Timing for judicial liens differs in different jurisdictions.  Usually, the timing date for 
judicial liens is the date when copies of judgments are filed with public records for real property 
and / or in the U.C.C. filing system.  In some jurisdictions, however, the timing date for judicial 
liens is the time government officials physically seize the property that is subject to the judicial 
liens or make symbolic gestures of seizing the property. Timing dates may also be the date of 
service of process of citations to discover assets. 
 Bankruptcy: The time debtors file for bankruptcy. 
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against property to the rest of the world. 
Usually (but not always), perfection requires affirmative conduct by the 
interest possessor, with that affirmative conduct usually being either the taking 
possession or control of the property that is the collateral or the creation of a 
public record of the security interest (by filing).  In some cases, however, the 
law says that security interests perfect automatically.  In automatic perfection 
cases, security interests perfect as soon as attachment occurs.  Another “not 
always” situation, but one that won’t concern us in this analysis, is perfection 
by placing notification on vehicle titles. 
Automatic perfection of security interests occurs in several different 
situations.  The best known of those situations, of course, is automatic 
perfection of security interests in consumer goods.  Automatic perfection also 
exists, however, in a couple of Article 2 instances and in connection with 
transfers of some payment rights.  Further, some security interests created in 
connection with securitizations also perfect automatically, as do some security 
interests created in connection with loan syndications.  In addition, security 
interests in “indispensable paper” also perfect automatically, albeit only for a 
temporary period of time.42   Finally, security interests in a “motley lot” of 
different situations – using Professor White’s terminology – also perfect 
automatically. 
However, perfection occurs for particular security interests.  Once 
perfection has occurred, the subject liens are fully effective.  This fact, in turn, 
has important priority consequences.  First, since Step 2 security interests and 
P-STJB non-consensual liens are both fully effective, Article 9 treats Step 2 
security interests and P-STJB non-consensual liens as equivalents in terms of 
priority timing.  Said differently, Article 9 puts Step 2 security interests and P-
STJB non-consensual liens in the same tier or layer of the hierarchy of 
priority.43  Second, since Article 9 treats Step 2 security interests and P-STJB 
liens as equivalents, these kinds of security interests and liens fight it out 
amongst themselves based on time obtained.44  Usually, earlier in time is 
earlier in line.  But this is, again, only within this tier.  Both kinds of claims in 
this layer or tier can beat earlier in time claims in lower layers or tiers.  Third, 
since Article 9 puts these kinds of claims together in the same tier, these kinds 
of claims usually fight it out amongst themselves based on time obtained.45  

42U.C.C. § 9-312(e) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).  Indispensable paper is 
usually said to include chattel paper, instruments, documents of title and investment security 
papers. 
43 Id. §§ 9-317(a)(2), 9-333; 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321–6323 (2012). 
44 U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). 
45 See generally id. § 9-322. 
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Earlier in time usually means earlier in line. 
A quick word must here be stated about a phenomenon that might be 
called “sucked in later collateral.”  In many cases, the consensual security 
interests that creditors have in the property of debtors (a) describe a category 
into which the collateral fits (e.g., inventory) and contains an “after-acquired 
property clause” (also known as a “floating lien).  In these cases, if collateral 
that fits into a described category later comes into the possession of the debtor, 
that later-arriving collateral is sucked into the earlier lien.46  The later arriving 
collateral then gets the perfection status and timing date of the original security 
interest.47  Further, security interests on collateral generally extend into 
collateral that are the “proceeds” of the disposition of earlier collateral.48  
When collateral goes out, proceeds comes in.  In these cases, including in 
bankruptcy, the security interest in the later arriving proceeds gets the 
perfection status of the earlier collateral and the timing date of the original 
security interest.  Similar “sucked in later” rules apply to “commingled 
property.49 
E.  “Purchase Money Interests” and the Notion of Super Priority 
Purchase money security interests (“PMIs”) are interests in property that 
creditors take in property to secure future payment of the money borrowed to 
purchase the particular property.50  Thus, for example, if D purchases an 
automobile and gives C, the car-finance company, an interest in the car to 
secure payment of the loan taken out to purchase the car, the security interest is 
a PMI.  Likewise, of the purchaser of a house gives the finance company a 
mortgage in the house to secure payment of the mortgage, the mortgage is a 
PMI.  On the contrary, if somebody already owns a car or a house and puts up 
that car or house to secure payment of a loan taken out to do something other 
than purchase the car or house, then the loan is a non-PMI.  Further, if a person 

46 Id. § 9-336 (a)–(c). 
47 Id. § 9-336(d). 
48 Id. § 9-315.  The general rule about proceeds being sucked into earlier liens is different 
when the filing for a security interest in the later-arriving collateral would generally have to be 
made in a different location than the location for the filing of the original collateral.  Id.                  
§ 9-315(d)(1).  This is called the “new office” rule.  There also are special rules for when the 
proceeds of the disposition of collateral are “cash proceeds.”  Id. § 9-315(d)–(e).  In particular, 
when the proceeds are cash proceeds, perfection automatically exists for 20 days.  Id.  However, if 
filing does NOT occur in the 20 days, the perfection for the cash proceeds interests goes away.  Id.  
Further, perfection for cash proceeds automatically occurs only if the cash proceeds are identifiably 
connected to the original collateral.  Id. § 9-315. 
49 Id. § 9-336(a). 
50 Id. § 9-103. 
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or business has a right to receive a payment from a debtor, and if the person or 
business which has that payment right puts up that right as security for a loan 
or credit purchase, then the security interest in the payment right will be a non-
PMI.  In Article 9, only goods and software can be the subject of PMIs.51 
For complicated reasons involving “after-acquired property” clauses (aka 
“floating liens”) and “category descriptions” and “proceeds” and the security 
interests that can exist in connection with those things—Article 9 says that 
properly perfected PMIs usually will have “super-priority.”52  Super-priority 
means that later-in-time PMIs usually will beat earlier in time non-PMIs. 53  
Thus, for example, if C1 has a non-PMI on some of D’s property that was 
perfected on January 1, and if C2 has a PMI on the same property of D that was 
perfected on May 1, C2 probably will beat C1 even though C1’s security 
interest in the property is earlier in time than C2’s interest.  Again, the reasons 
for this are quite complicated. 
It should immediately be clear that claimants who have properly 
perfected PMIs54 in debtors’ property will have very high priority in that 
property.  Hence, PMI claimants to property usually will beat all non-PMI 
creditors in connection with their claims to that property.55  Among PMI 

51 Id. § 9-103(a)(1). 
52 Id. § 9-324. 
53 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code says that Debtors in Possession (DIP) can, 
under some circumstances, have priority in bankrupt debtors’ property.  Commentators on the 
Bankruptcy Code sometimes talk about this idea as involving “super-priority.”  The super-priority 
described herein – Article 9 super priority – is completely different from DIP super priority in the 
Bankruptcy Code.  
54 Perfection occurs in various ways for different PMIs.  For example, consumer goods PMIs 
perfect automatically.  This is an important fact because, historically, lots and lots of consumer 
goods PMIs existed.  However, this isn’t a particularly important idea today because individual 
buyers at the present time usually don’t buy goods on “store credit.”  Rather, individual buyers 
usually buy on unsecured credit with Visa, MasterCard, etc.  Second, with non-inventory / non-live 
stock PMIs, creditors have a 20-day “grace period” to perfect security interests in the property.  If 
the creditors perfect within the 20 days, the perfection becomes permanent.  Otherwise, the 
perfection goes away.  U.C.C. § 9-324(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).  Finally, 
with inventory / livestock PMIs – which category problem incorporates the vast majority of PMIs – 
creditors have super priority if they perfect (a) before the debtors take possession of the property 
and (b) have notified other creditors of the debtors of the new PMI.  Id. §§ 9-324(b), 9-324(d). 
55 Not surprisingly, some complicated rules come into play in the context of super priority.  
First, Article 9, specifically section 9-324(b), says that creditors who wish to take PMIs in non-
inventory / non-livestock collateral get super priority only if they perfect their interests—usually by 
filing—within 20 days of attachment of the liens to the non-inventory/non-livestock collateral.  
This 20-day grace period gives inventory / livestock PMI creditors a short, but certainly not-too-
short time frame in which to achieve perfections (and accompanying super-priority) in property.  
Besides, filing itself takes essentially no time nowadays because filing in most jurisdictions can 
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creditors, credit sellers usually will have priority over credit lenders.56 
F.  Rightful Possessors of Property 
Recall that we started by stating the “wrongful possessors” of property 
have no rights in the property at all.  Hence, some people or businesses that 
have property should not even be allowed to possess the property.  Further, if 
these persons or business can possess the property, they certainly will possess 
that property subject to any consensual security interests or non-consensual 
liens that exist against that property.  Recall also that it was said at the outset 
that wrongful possessors of property probably are relatively rare in the real 
world.  Rather, in many, many cases, possessors of property can be classified 
as “rightful possessors” of property. 
Rightful possessors of property go at the very top of our hierarchy of 
priorities.  Rightful possessors have the right to possess the property.  Just as 
importantly, however, rightful possessors of property in many cases have the 
right to possess that property free of consensual security interests and non-
consensual liens that may encumber that property.  Hence, in many cases, 
rightful possessors of property will have priority in that property over any 
interest or lien claims to the property. 
Rightful possessors of property come in several distinct varieties.  First, 

easily be done over the Internet.  Id. § 9-324(b).  Second, a different methodology exists for 
perfecting PMIs in inventory and livestock and for getting super priority in these instances.  PMIs 
in inventory / livestock are perfected (and get super-priority) only if the creditors (1) notify other 
creditors of the planned PMI and (2) file financing statements about the inventory and do both of 
those things before the purchasers take possession of the inventory / livestock.  This process gives 
earlier inventory lenders double protection.  First, because of the notification requirement, new 
inventory creditors of debtors must inform other inventory creditors of the debtors of the planned 
PMIs and must do this before the debtors get possession of the new inventory.  This notification 
solves the advances problem.  Second, because of the filing requirement and the fact that the filing 
must occur before the purchasers take possession, earlier creditors can check the filing records 
before they make advances to the debtors.  The filing records will show the new PMI.  Thus, again, 
these special rules for perfection of inventory (and livestock) PMIs solve the advances problem.  
Third, it is not uncommon for already encumbered debtors to obtain and perfect PMIs in the same 
property from both a credit seller and a credit lender and to do this on the same days, or within the 
same 20 day grace periods.  This is, of course, totally unethical and illegal in many jurisdictions.  
But, desperate people sometimes do desperate things. There is no really good solution to the 
problem just described.  So, the UCC just flips a coin and says the following:  If credit sellers and 
credit lenders both have perfected PMIs in the same property with the same priority date (or within 
the same 20 day grace period), the credit sellers will beat the credit lenders.  Id. § 9-324(g).  Credit 
lenders, the UCC says (sort of randomly), are better able to take the loss in these rare cases than 
credit sellers. 
56 Id. § 9-324(g) cmt. 13. 
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in many cases, creditors who have consensual security interests in some of the 
property of debtors authorize the debtors to dispose of the property.  This is 
particularly so if the property that is the subject of the security interest is 
inventory to the debtors.  If debtors then dispose of this property—which, 
again, the debtors do with permission of the creditors—the third parties to take 
the possession of the property do so free of the interests in it.57  Second, in two 
instances, Article 2 of the UCC says that a buyer or seller who has possession 
of property has the highest priority in that property.58  These two instances, 
which are principally designed to defeat claims brought by bankruptcy trustees 
of a buyer or seller, involve shipments of property under reservation and 
rightful rejections or revocations of acceptance of the property by the non-
bankrupt buyer or seller.  Third, Article 9 says that possessors of property who 
have perfected security interests by “control of” the property have priority, in 
some cases, over claimants who have perfected security interests in the 
property by methods other than control.59 
Fourth, in some cases that sound obscure but cover many real world 
cases, buyers of goods—these are not “buyers in the ordinary course of 
business” (who we will get to in a moment) but just “buyers” of such 
goods60—take the goods free of security interests that creditors get in the goods 
if the security interests arise in connection with “advances” that the creditors 
make on earlier loans.61  Buyers will take the property free of these advances 
interests if the creditors get the interests after they learn that the buyers bought 
the goods or, more importantly, if the creditors take the interests more than 
forty-five days after the buyers buy the goods.62  A similar advances rule exists 
for leased goods.63  To repeat, the buyers or lessees here are not “buyers in the 
ordinary course of business”. 
Collectively, the most important examples of rightful possessors of 

57 Id. § 9-315(a).  In these cases, the creditors usually get security interests in the “proceeds” 
of the disposition of the property, with proceeds often being money or other forms of payment.  
The security interests in the proceeds then take the place of the interests in the property itself. 
58 U.C.C. §§ 2-505, 2-711 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002). 
59 Id. § 9-328 (2010); see also id. §§ 9-312, 9-104, 9-107, 9-312(b) to 9-314. 
60 Id. § 9-320(a).  In this analysis, buyers in the ordinary course of business here are classified 
as “good faith possessors” of property.  We will come to these kinds of possessors of property in a 
moment. 
61 Generally speaking, creditors who make “advances” on earlier loans automatically get 
security interests in property that debtors bought.  These advances interests generally have the 
perfection status and timing dates of the original interests.  Creditors who make advances such as 
in the present case are an exception to that general rule.  
62 U.C.C. § 9-323(d)–(e) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).  
63 Id. § 9-323(f). 
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property can be called “good faith possessors” of the property.  Under Article 
9, and other sources of law, these good faith possessors have been given 
extraordinary rights in the property.  In most cases, good faith possessors of 
property have the highest claim to a property.  Furthermore, these possessors of 
property generally take the property free of existing security interests in it.  
Examples of “good faith possessors” of property, i.e. possessors of property 
who have the highest priority in the property, are: 
 
(1) Good Faith Purchasers of Goods;64  
 
(2) Buyers in the Ordinary Course of Business;65 
 
(3) Holders of Article 7 Documents of Title (Bills of Lading and 
Warehouse Receipts);66 
 
(4) Holders in Due Course of Article 3 Payment Instruments;67 
 
(5) Assignees of Accounts Where Underlying Contracts Include Waivers 
of Defenses;68  
 
(6) Consumer Buyers from Consumer Sellers (The Garage Sale Rule);69 
 
(7) Some Possessors of Some Kinds of Chattel Paper.70 

64 Id. § 2-403 (2002). 
65 Id. § 9-320(a) (2010); see also id. §§ 2-201(9), 2-403 (2002). 
66 Id. § 2-201(21) (2002); see also id. § 7-502 (2003). 
67 Id. § 3-302 (2002); see also id. § 9-316 (2010). 
68 Id. § 9-403 (2010). 
69 Id. § 9-320(b). 
70 Id. § 9-330.  The UCC says that there are two different kinds of chattel paper.  First, in a 
very large number of cases, retailers who purchase inventory from wholesalers or manufacturers 
give the wholesalers or manufacturers of that inventory interests in the inventory that they 
purchase.  The wholesalers and manufacturers in these cases also take “proceeds” interest from the 
retailers’ disposition of the inventory.  (Proceeds are the product of the disposition of other 
collateral.)  Later, the retailers sell this inventory to third parties (customers) and in exchange for 
the inventory get chattel paper from the third parties.  The chattel paper in these cases is “merely 
[the] proceeds” of the retailers’ disposition of the inventory collateral.  Since the original creditors 
have proceeds interests in this chattel paper, the original creditors claim this paper.  The UCC 
Permanent Editorial Board calls this “Type A” chattel paper, or “merely proceeds” chattel paper.  
Second, in some rare cases, original creditors take interests in chattel paper that is not merely the 
proceeds of the disposition of inventory.  Rather, in these cases, the chattel paper in which the 
2015                                     THE HIERARCHY OF PRIORITY                                   173 

 
Quick analysis reveals that it is remarkably easy to qualify as a good 
faith possessor of property.  Indeed, only three elements are necessary to so 
qualify. First, the transferees must give value for the property or rights they 
receive.71  So, gift transferees cannot have the status of good faith possessor of 
property. Second, the transferees must act in good faith regarding the 
transfers.72  Good faith in this context means that the transferees have used 
their industry’s normal business practices.  Lastly, the transferees cannot have 
knowledge of the problems with the property or rights that they are taking by 

original creditors take interests has value independent of the debtors’ sales of inventory.  The UCC 
Permanent Editorial Board calls this “Type B” chattel paper or “other than merely proceeds” 
chattel paper; it is hard to come up with even a single example.   
In connection with both Type A and Type B chattel paper, the chattel paper creditors 
sometimes later transfer the chattel paper to second financers, usually in exchange for immediate 
cash.  These second financers then also take interests in the chattel paper. In these cases, 
conflicting claims to the paper can arise:  The original creditors can claim the paper either as 
proceeds of the disposition of inventory collateral (Type A chattel paper) or as original collateral 
(Type B chattel paper).  But, the second financers also claim the paper because of their interests in 
it. 
Lots of confusion exists among lawyers, commentators, and judges about the impact of the 
foregoing, and even if the foregoing is an accurate statement of the law.  However, White and 
Summers give us what perhaps is the best explanation for what is going on here generally, and why 
the difference between Type A and Type B matters. First, with both Type A paper (merely 
proceeds) and with Type B paper (other than merely proceeds), original creditors who have claims 
against the chattel paper can defeat claims against it by second financers simply by stamping a 
“legend” on the face of the paper.  A legend states that that paper is subject to the original 
creditors’ security interest.  In effect, this stamp or legend makes it impossible for the second 
financers to assert that they do not have knowledge of the original creditors’ interests in the paper.  
The paper itself describes the original interests.  Second, if the chattel paper is not stamped 
or legended, then the paper will be treated differently depending on whether it is Type A or Type 
B.  With unstamped Type A chattel paper, the second financers will have priority over the original 
creditor even if the second financer knew—from a source other than the paper itself (often a 
publicly recorded financing statement)—that somebody else already has a security interest in the 
paper.  The second financer, in this situation, is a good faith possessor of the chattel paper property.  
However, with unstamped Type B chattel paper, the second financer will have priority in the paper 
only if the second financer was unaware that the paper was subject to an already-existing security 
interest in it.  The bottom Line is if original creditors stamp or legend chattel paper in which they 
claim a security interest, the original creditors will have priority in that paper over second financers 
whether the paper is Type A or Type B paper.  However, if original creditors do not stamp or 
legend chattel paper, then different rules apply to Type A and Type B chattel paper. Type A paper 
(knowledge by second financers from sources other than the paper itself of the earlier interest in the 
paper does not defeat the second financers’ claims) provides less protection to original creditors 
than Type B. 
71 See generally U.C.C. §§ 9-317 to 9-339. 
72 Id. 
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transfer.73  This does not mean that there are no problems, it just means that the 
transferees do not know about the problems. 
It will be easy, in many cases, for transferees of property to show all 
three of these elements.  So, in many cases, transferees of property or rights 
will qualify as good faith possessors of property and will have the highest 
priority in particular property.74  This highest priority means, among other 
things, that these claimants will take the property free of third party security 
interests and liens. 
II.  THE HIERARCHY OF ARTICLE 9 PRIORITY:  
A GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION 
As noted at the outset, it is possible to put together a list of seven 
different kinds of claimants (or different kinds of interests) to particular 
property of debtors.  Claimants early on this list—claimants graphically at the 
bottom of our chart of hierarchy—have low priority in the property.  If debtors 
have limited amounts of property, these low-priority claimants usually will get 
little or nothing.  Conversely, claimants late on this list—claimants who are 
high on the chart of priority—usually will recover at least something.   
Claimants within the individual tiers or layers of this hierarchy of priorities 
usually will fight it out amongst themselves using the earlier-in-time (earlier-
in-line) general rule.  
 

73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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TABLE 1: The Hierarchy of Article 9 Priorities 
 
 “RIGHTFUL POSSESSORS” OF PROPERTY 
Rightful possessors of property include possessors of property who are the beneficiaries of 
authorized disposition of collateral, two instances of Article 2 possession (2-505, 2-711), plain 
vanilla buyers of goods, in some cases involving “advances” on earlier loans, and possessors of 
property who have perfected interests in property by possession or control of that property (rather 
than through other methods of perfection).  Most importantly, rightful possessors include 
possessors who can be called “good faith possessors” of the property.  This category includes: (1) 
Good Faith Purchasers of Goods; (2) Buyers in the Ordinary Course of Business; (3) Holders of 
Article 7 Documents of Title (Bills of Lading and Warehouse Receipts); (4) Holders in Due 
Course of Article 3 Payment Instruments; (5) Assignees of Accounts Where Underlying Contracts 
Include Waivers of Defenses; (6) Consumer Buyers from Consumer Sellers (The Garage Sale 
Rule); and (7) Some Possessors of Some Kinds of Chattel Paper. 
 
In several important contexts, property that is not in the possession of debtors at the time of initial 
security interests, but that later comes into the possession of debtors, can be sucked into the initial 
(and earlier-in-time) security interests.  This usually happens in connection with after-acquired 
property (AAP) clauses, clauses that run alongside category descriptions of collateral.  “Proceeds” 
also are sucked into earlier interests.  With comingled property, the interests share pro rata. 
Outside of bankruptcy, interests in AAP that are in category descriptions get the perfection status 
and time of the initial interests. 
In bankruptcy, interests on proceeds get the perfection times of the initial interests.  In other 
instances of sucked-in-later collateral and bankruptcy, however, and leaving aside comingled 
property, the timing dates for the interests in the later-arriving collateral is the later time of the 
debtors’ possession of the property rather than the earlier time of the initial interests.  With 
comingled property, the competing interests share pro rata. 
Article 9 also has some specialized priority rules not described on this chart, rules involving, for 
example, “local law” (U.C.C. § 9-301 et seq.) and specialized financing methods (U.C.C. § 9-326 
et seq.) 
PERFECTED PMIS 
Perfected purchase money interests (PMIs) get super-priority.  This means that later-in-time PMIs 
can beat earlier-in-time non-PMIs and P-STJB liens. 
Reminder: PMIs are NOT a rare exception in terms of security interests.  Rather, many perfected 
security interests—probably even a large majority—are PMIs.  So, many perfected security 
interests go in this PMI level rather than the level below, non-PMIs and P-STJB liens. 
The Process for Getting PMIs 
Except in connection with inventory and livestock, PMI holders get super-priority if they file 
within twenty days of attachment of the interests to the property.  This idea exists mostly to protect 
later potential credit sellers or lenders from earlier-in-time AAP clauses and proceeds interests. 
With inventory and livestock, PMI holders get super-priority if they file and notify other interest 
creditors before taking possession of the property.  This rule exists mostly to protect earlier-in-time 
inventory lenders. 
In rare cases where competing PMIs exist in the same property, PMI credit sellers generally beat 
PMI credit lenders. 
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ATTACHED AND PERFECTED NON-PMIS AND P-STJB LIENS 
Perfected Non-PMIs and Possessory-Statutory, Tax, Judicial and Bankruptcy liens (P-STJB) beat 
Step 1 consensual liens and general claims.  PMIs do NOT go here. 
Perfected Non-PMIs and P-STJB liens compete with each other on an equal basis.  Earlier-in-time 
liens in this level beat later-in-time liens in this level.  Again, PMIs do not go here. 
Reminder: Many perfected consensual interests—perhaps most perfected consensual interests in 
percentage numbers—are PMIs. So, many (and perhaps most) perfected consensual interests do 
not go in this level.  Rather, many perfected consensual interests go in the next higher level. 
Timing for Non-PMIs and P-STJB Liens 
Non-PMIs:  The timing date for Non-PMIs is the date of perfection of the Non-PMIs. 
Statutory Liens: Timing for statutory liens differs in different jurisdictions.  Usually, the time will 
be the time providers of services retain possession of the property or submit appropriate paperwork 
to government officials.  Important Note:  In construction cases, the general rule is that all 
statutory liens on the construction take effect at the time of beginning of construction.  Thus, later 
service providers in construction cases will have the same timing date for liens as earlier service 
providers.  
Tax Liens: The time tax authorities file tax lien paperwork in the U.C.C. or real property recording 
systems.  
Judicial Liens: Timing for judicial liens differs in different jurisdictions.  Usually, the timing date 
for judicial liens is the date when copies of judgments are filed with public records for real 
property or in the U.C.C. filing system.  In some jurisdictions, however, the timing date for 
judicial liens is the time government officials physically seize the property that is subject to the 
judicial liens or make symbolic gestures of seizing the property. Another useful timing date may 
be the date of service of process of citations to discover assets. 
Bankruptcy Liens (bankruptcy trustee has “status of a lien creditor”): The time debtors file for 
bankruptcy. 
 
ATTACHED BUT NOT PERFECTED SECURITY INTERESTS 
Step 1 security interests—attached but not perfected—beat general claimants because these are 
claims against specific property rather than just claims against the persons of debtors.  However, 
Step 1 security interests—attached but not perfected—lose to perfected security interests and to 
non-consensual STJB liens.  Bankruptcy liens—the “status of” a lien creditor—pulls all the 
general creditors, collectively, into this level of the hierarchy. 
 
GENERAL CLAIMANTS 
General claimants against debtors—also known as unsecured claimants—beat wrongful possessors 
of the property.  Among general claimants, those earlier-in-time beat those later-in-time.   
Important Note: When debtors file for bankruptcy, debtors’ bankruptcy trustees become 
representatives for all of the debtors’ general creditors.  The bankruptcy trustees then get the 
“status of” lien creditors.  Thus, the bankruptcy trustees, who, to repeat, represent all the general 
creditors collectively, move into the next higher hierarchy level. 
 
WRONGFUL POSSESSORS OF PROPERTY 
Wrongful possessors of property (including, most importantly, “innocent converters” of property) 
have no right to the subject property at all.  Thus, wrongful possessors lose to everybody.  They 
may not be able to possess the property generally.  Further, if they can possess it, they will take it 
subject to its interests in it.  Note: Innocent converters might have claims against their transferees 
for the wrongful transfers. 
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CONCLUSION 
Because “priorities” in claims encompass such an important issue in 
connection with debtors and creditors, many commentators spend lots of time 
discussing priorities.  Unfortunately, however, most of these discussions use 
what might be called an individualized or seriatim approach to priorities.  The 
commentators start out by describing the priorities for an individual kind of 
property or an individual kind of transaction.  Then the commentators move on 
to a second kind of property or transaction and talk about the priority rules for 
those cases.  After finishing the discussion of priorities for this second kind of 
property or transaction, the commentators move on to a third kind of property 
or transaction, and then on to a fourth, etc.  Hardly any commentators, it seems, 
attempt to show how different priority ideas fit together with each other, or 
where different kinds of priorities have related but different impacts on 
individual debtors or creditors.  Discussions of priorities, for example, rarely (if 
ever) show how creditors with “attached but not perfected” security interests 
stand in relation to other kinds of creditors.  Likewise, discussions of priorities 
rarely (if ever) show how various liens—for example, possessory-statutory, 
tax, bankruptcy, and judicial liens—fit into an overall scheme of priority.  
Rather, most discussions of priorities simply state what the priority is for 
certain kinds of claims and state nothing further.  No overall scheme is 
described. 
The above analysis addressed this problem by suggesting that there is an 
overall “hierarchy of priorities” articulated in Article 9 of the UCC, a hierarchy 
that consists of seven distinct layers or tiers.  Creditors who are in layers or 
tiers at or near the bottom of this hierarchy have very low priority.  They, 
likely, will get little or nothing from debtors if the debtors have limited assets.  
Conversely, creditors who are in tiers or layers at or near the top of this 
hierarchy have high priority.  These creditors will likely get at least something 
from debtors when different creditors assert claims against the debtors.  Within 
the different tiers or layers in the hierarchy, creditors usually fight it out 
amongst themselves using the earlier-in-time or earlier-in-line rule.  
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